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I See London, I See France
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO “SAGGY” PANTS LAWS
In recent years, a number of communities across the
United States have passed laws against what can only be
described as a new low: saggy pants. “Saggy” or “baggy” pants,
the wearing of which is commonly called “sagging,”1 is a style of
dress characterized by the wearing of pants well below the
waist, thus exposing underwear and/or flesh to public view.2
While the style has been around since at least the early 1990s,3
previous efforts to prohibit saggy pants have focused on
banning them in the public schools context because of their
association with urban street gangs.4 Now, however, outraged
communities have extended the battle to the public streets by
enacting indecent exposure laws intended to criminalize the
wearing of saggy pants.5
However, these ordinances have not been without
controversy.6 Free speech and civil rights advocates have
heavily criticized these laws as an infringement upon freedom
of expression, and potentially motivated by racial bias.7 At least
1

Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes: Va. Delegate’s Proposal in 2004
Drew Ridicule, but He Might Have Last Laugh, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 12,
2008, at A4 [hereinafter Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes].
2
See, e.g., Niko Koppel, Are Your Jeans Sagging? Go Directly to Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at G1; Laura Parker, Cities Snapping Over Baggy Pants, USA
TODAY, Oct. 15, 2007, at A3.
3
Elizabeth Wellington, A Fashion Firestorm over Pants That Sag; New
Jersey Proposals Target Hip-Hop Style, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1.
4
See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 664
(S.D.Tex. 1997) (challenged school dress code prohibited “gang-related apparel” such as
“[o]versized apparel, including baggy pants which are worn low on the waist”); Bivens
v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D.N.M. 1995) (challenged dress code
prohibited the wearing of sagging pants); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827
F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (challenged school dress code provided that
“[c]lothes shall be sufficient to conceal undergarments at all times”).
5
See infra Part I.B.
6
See, e.g., infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
7
E.g., Koppel, supra note 2, at G1; Greg Lacour, Measure Fails 6-1: ‘Saggy
Pants’ Proposal Voted Down; Style Won’t Be Banned as Indecent Exposure, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (N.C.), Oct. 17, 2007, at B1 (noting that the main proponent of a proposed
saggy pants ordinance in Charlotte, N.C., County Commissioner Bill James, had
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one court has already held a saggy pants ordinance
unconstitutional,8 although this has not deterred other
communities from enforcing their own saggy pants laws.9 Even
President Obama weighed in on the issue during the 2008
campaign.10
This Note will explore the constitutional issues raised
by saggy pants laws, focusing on the two principal
constitutional rights implicated: the freedom of expression
protected by the First Amendment11 and the liberty in personal
appearance protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 Part I describes the origins of the
saggy pants style and the rise of saggy pants ordinances. Part
II surveys the First Amendment legal landscape in the context
of expressive conduct, and concludes that despite the stringent
nature of the Supreme Court’s current governing test for
distinguishing conduct from speech, saggy pants laws
impermissibly burden the right to free speech. Part III
discusses the Due Process Clause jurisprudence regarding
personal appearance and its application to saggy pants laws,
arguing that the public’s right to determine matters of personal
appearance is unconstitutionally infringed by saggy pants
ordinances. This Note concludes that because of the potential
difficulty in establishing that wearing saggy pants is
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, the
more promising avenue for potential litigants may be under the
Due Process Clause’s protection of individual liberty.

previously expressed a belief that urban blacks live in a “moral sewer,” and quoting an
opponent of the law who believed the ordinance was motivated by James’ “‘dislike and
hate for the African American community’”).
8
Eliot Kleinberg, Judge Releases Teen, Criticizes Riviera Beach’s Saggy
Pants Law, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 16, 2008, at B1.
9
Steve Neavling, Flint’s Police Chief Shrugs at Fla. Saggy Pants Ruling;
Law is Unconstitutional, Judge Decides, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 18, 2008, at 5; see
also infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
10
Ask Obama (MTV television broadcast Nov. 3, 2008) (“I think passing a
law about people wearing sagging pants is a waste of time. . . . Having said that,
brothers should pull up their pants.”); see also Geoff Earle, Kick in Pants from O—
’Brothers, Stop Sagging’, N.Y. POST, Nov. 4, 2008, at 9.
11
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
12
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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A few words are necessary to delineate what this Note is
not: the constitutional analysis herein is of saggy pants laws as
they apply to a wearer of saggy pants who is not showing any
flesh whatsoever, but merely has visible undergarments above
the waistband. The constitutionality of indecent exposure laws
in the context of actual nudity or visible flesh above the saggy
pants is beyond the scope of this Note.13 Furthermore, this Note
does not discuss the potential Equal Protection Clause14 issues
raised by the enactment of saggy pants laws with a racially
discriminatory purpose,15 or the enforcement of such laws in a
racially discriminatory manner,16 as such claims are factsensitive to the context of each particular community.
I.

SAGGY PANTS AND SAGGY PANTS ORDINANCES

A.

Emergence of Saggy Pants

The practice of sagging began in prisons, which issued
baggy uniforms without belts in order to deter suicide attempts
and the use of belts as weapons.17 As prisoners were released,
the style migrated from the prison population to urban ghettos,
where it was adopted by street gangs as a means of self-

13

For discussion of these issues, see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277
(2000) (constitutionality of a municipal nudity ban as applied to a nude dancing
establishment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, (1991) (challenge to a
public indecency statute applied to nude dancing); DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach,
812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987) (male successfully challenged municipal ordinance
banning shirtless jogging); S. Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608
(11th Cir. 1984) (upholding public indecency statute from First Amendment challenge
by nude sunbathers).
14
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15
For examples of facially neutral laws invalidated because they were
enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, see Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that facially neutral plan to close
all public schools had racially discriminatory purpose of preventing desegregation) and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that facially neutral law redefining
city boundaries had racially discriminatory purpose of disenfranchising AfricanAmericans).
16
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (“Though the law
itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.”).
17
Koppel, supra note 2.
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identification with gang and prison culture.18 Saggy pants were
in turn adopted by hip-hop artists and rappers,19 many of whom
were former gang members.20 The ascendancy of hip-hop in the
popular culture spread sagging into the suburbs and around
the world.21 Whether characterized as “incarceration chic”22 or a
“badge of delinquency,”23 saggy pants have clearly been
embraced by a large subsection of America’s youth.24 This result
is perhaps unsurprising, given the size and demographics of
the prison population in the United States,25 the prevalence of
gang membership and gang violence,26 and the tremendous
popularity of hip-hop music.27
18

Guy Trebay, In Jailhouse Chic, an Anti-Style Turns Into a Style Itself, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2000, at B8 [hereinafter Trebay, In Jailhouse] (discussing the
influence of prison uniforms on street style).
19
Koppel, supra note 2.
20
David L. Shabazz, Editorial, Rap Artists’ Thug Images Became Too Real,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 18, 2005, at A13.
21
Guy Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop Seriously. Seriously., N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2003, at B11 [hereinafter Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop] (noting that “[t]he history of style
th
in the late 20 century . . . is substantially the history of hip-hop,” and any survey of
fashion in the last two decades could not omit the importance of “track suits, sweat
clothes, wrestling, boxing or soccer shoes, designer sneakers, outsize denims, prisonstyle jumpsuits, underwear worn above the trouser waistband, do-rags, cargo pants,
messenger bags, dreadlocks, cornrows, athletic jerseys, Kangol caps” (emphasis
added)).
22
Trebay, In Jailhouse, supra note 18.
23
Koppel, supra note 2 (commenting that “[n]ot since the zoot suit has a style
been greeted with such strong disapproval,” referring to the outsized suits favored by
young urban minorities in the 1930’s and 1940’s, which were seen as unpatriotically
mocking fabric conservation efforts during World War II).
24
See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 2; Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop, supra note 21;
Trebay, In Jailhouse, supra note 18.
25
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PUBLICATION
NCJ 217675, PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 1, 8-9 (2007), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
reports that at midyear 2006 there were 2,245,189 prisoners in custody nationwide,
including approximately 836,800 black men. Relative to the general population, 1 in
every 133 U.S. residents is in prison or jail; 4.8% of all black men were in custody,
compared to about 0.7% of white men and 1.9% of Hispanic men. About 11.7% of all
black males age 25 to 29 were incarcerated at midyear 2006.
26
There are an estimated 21,500 youth gangs in the United States, with
731,500 gang members. All cities with populations of 250,000 or more reported gang
problems. NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASSOCIATIONS, 2005 NATIONAL
GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, at ix (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/
what/2005_threat_assesment.pdf. Between 1993 and 2003, perpetrators were identified
as gang members in about 12% of all aggravated assaults, 4% of rapes, 10% of
robberies, and 6% of simple assaults. ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS PUBLICATION NCJ 208875, VIOLENCE BY GANG MEMBERS, 19932003, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vgm03.pdf.
27
In 2004, four of the five nominees for the Grammy Award for Record of the
Year were hip-hop songs. Sarah Rodman, Rap Hip-Hops to Head of the Grammy Class,
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 6, 2004, at E4. In October 2003, the top ten songs in the
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In response to the problem of gang-related school
violence, many school districts throughout the United States
have adopted dress codes that ban the wearing of gang-related
apparel.28 Some states have even granted authority to local
school boards to mandate school uniforms.29 Dress codes have
generally withstood constitutional challenge because of the
important governmental interest in safeguarding the
educational process and courts’ reluctance to second-guess
educational policy decisions.30 Perhaps drawing on the success
of some local communities in banning saggy pants in schools,31
some state lawmakers attempted to extend these bans to the
streets.
B.

Saggy Pants Ordinances

The movement to outlaw saggy pants in public began in
the state legislatures of Louisiana and Virginia. In 2004, the
Louisiana legislature voted down a bill that would have made
it “unlawful for any person to wear clothing in any public place
or place open to public view which either: (1) Intentionally
exposes undergarments; or (2) Intentionally exposes any
portion of the pubic hair, cleft of the buttocks, or genitals,” with
Billboard Hot 100 were all by African-American artists, a first in the history of the
Billboard charts, “signaling the culmination of hip-hop’s ascent as the dominant force
in popular music and culture.” Joan Anderman, Hip-Hop Setting the Beat in First,
Black Artists Hold Billboard’s Top 10, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 2003, at A1.
28
See generally Amy Mitchell Wilson, Public School Dress Codes: The
Constitutional Debate, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 147 (examining the constitutionality of
school dress codes); Wendy Mahling, Note, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV. 715 (1996). For
an in-depth analysis of the problems of vagueness and comprehensibility in student
codes of conduct and suggested guidelines for designing effective and legally defensible
student discipline rules, see Peter Sansom & Frank Kemerer, It’s All About Rules, 166
EDUC. LAW REP. 395 (West 2002).
29
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(b) (West 2004) (“The governing board of
any school district may adopt or rescind a reasonable dress code policy that requires
pupils to wear a schoolwide uniform or prohibits pupils from wearing ‘gang-related
apparel’ . . . .”).
30
See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008);
Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005); Canady v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001). But see Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308-11 (8th Cir. 1997) (striking down school regulation
prohibiting gang symbols without providing any definition of gang); Chalifoux v. New
Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 667-69 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (striking down a
dress code provision which banned “gang-related apparel” as overly vague). For a
discussion of the constitutional rights of students, see infra notes 116-122 and
accompanying text.
31
See Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 559-61 (D.N.M.
1995).
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certain exceptions such as “[c]lothing worn in a private
residence” or “[s]wimming attire worn at a swimming pool or
beach.”32 Violators would have been subject to three days of
community service and a maximum fine of $175.33 In 2005, the
Virginia state legislature considered a bill to outlaw saggy
pants in public that would have imposed a maximum fine of
$50 on any person who “intentionally wears and displays his
below-waist undergarments, intended to cover a person’s
intimate parts, in a lewd or indecent manner.”34 The bill passed
the Virginia House, but died in a Senate committee.35 Although
these bills did not pass, both proposals drew widespread media
coverage,36 and in the ensuing years several localities have
enacted their own saggy pants ordinances.
Louisiana has been at the forefront of the movement to
outlaw saggy pants, with at least six cities passing such laws in
recent years.37 For example, the ordinance in Gonzales,
Louisiana, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in any public place or in view of
the public, to intentionally expose his or her genitalia or
undergarments, or be guilty of any indecent or lewd behavior.
(1) Any person convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00).
(2) Any person convicted of a second offense of violating the provisions of this
section shall be punished by a fine not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars
($150.00).
(3) Any person convicted of a third offense of violating the provisions shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) and up to two
38
(2) eight-hour days of community service or trash abatement.

Other Louisiana cities even provide for the possibility of
jail time for violators of their saggy pants ordinances.39 For

32

H.B. 1703, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2004). The legislative history and
voting results can be found at http://legis.state.la.us.
33
Id.
34
H.B. 1981, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005).
35
Christina Bellantoni, Senators Drop “Droopy Drawers”; Bill Had Made
State a Global Joke, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at B1.
36
See, e.g., Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes, supra note 1 (noting
that “[m]edia outlets from around the world descended on Richmond”); Bellantoni,
supra note 35, at B1 (noting that the Virginia legislation made headlines “in
newspapers as far away as Australia,” and that the Louisiana bill was the subject of a
parody on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart).
37
Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes, supra note 1.
38
GONZALES, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-145 (2007), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=10845&sid=18.
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example, the law in Abbeville, Louisiana, allows for up to six
months’ imprisonment:
It shall be unlawful for any person in a public place or in view of the
public to wear pants or a skirt in such a manner as to expose their
underlying garments.
Any person violating this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be
fined not more than three hundred dollars ($300.00) or imprisoned
for not more than six (6) months, or both.40

The movement to outlaw saggy pants has spread well
beyond Louisiana.41 Similar laws have been enacted in Pine
Lawn, Missouri;42 Hawkinsville, Georgia;43 Lynwood, Illinois;44
and Riviera Beach, Florida.45 In Flint, Michigan, the police chief
has announced his intention to apply existing disorderly
conduct laws against those who wear saggy pants.46 Other cities
39

See, e.g., ABBEVILLE, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-25 (2008), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=10339&sid=18; Koppel, supra note
2 (discussing ordinance in Mansfield, Louisiana, which allows for up to fifteen days’
imprisonment); Saggy-Pants Laws No Longer Butt of Jokes, supra note 1 (discussing
ordinance in Delcambre, Louisiana, providing for up to six months of jail time).
40
ABBEVILLE, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-25 (2007).
41
Other Louisiana cities enacting such laws include Shreveport, Port Allen,
Alexandria, Donaldsonville, and Baker. SHREVEPORT, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 50167
(2007),
available
at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?
pid=10151&sid=18 (maximum fine of $250 and four days of community service); PORT
ALLEN,
LA.,
CODE
OF
ORDINANCES
§
54-13
(2007),
available
at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=10009&sid=18 (maximum fine
of $500); ALEXANDRIA, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-128 (2007), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=11767&sid=18 (penalizing the
parent or legal guardian of any juvenile cited for a violation with fines of up to $200, up
to forty hours community service, and even mandatory attendance by both parent and
child at a family counseling program; adults subject to same penalties for their own
violations); Samuel Irwin, Deputies to Begin ‘Saggy’ Warnings, BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, March 13, 2008, at B4, available at http://www.2theadvocate.com/
news/16632621.html (describing Donaldsonville ordinance); Marilyn Goff, Baker
Council Votes to Ban Sagging Pants, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Oct. 29, 2008, at B2,
available at http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/33486334.html (describing Baker
ordinance; maximum fine of $250 and four days of community service).
42
Denise Hollinshed, Baggy Pants Ban Is Working, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2008 [hereinafter Hollinshed, Baggy Pants].
43
Jennifer Burk, No One Yet Tagged for Too Much Sag in Hawkinsville,
MACON TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Nov. 27, 2007, at B.
44
William Lee, Village Cracks Down on Exposed Undies, CHICAGO SUNTIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at 18.
45
Dianna Cahn, Riviera Beach Police Enforcing Fashion Law;
Constitutionality of the Saggy Pants Law is Being Questioned, SOUTH FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Sept. 8, 2008, at B1. This law was later held unconstitutional “based on the
limited facts of this case” by Palm Beach County Circuit Judge Paul Moyle in one of the
first lawsuits challenging such laws. Kleinberg, supra note 8.
46
Bryn Mickle, ACLU: Fla. Ruling Cuts Holes in Flint’s Low-Pants Ban,
FLINT J. (Mich.), Sept. 18, 2008, at A1.
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considering the adoption of their own saggy pants ordinances
include: Baltimore, Maryland;47 Trenton and Pleasantville, New
Jersey;48 Bel-Ridge and Moline Acres, Missouri;49 Duncan,
Oklahoma;50 Yonkers, New York;51 Gardena, California;52 and
Atlanta,53 Rome, Brunswick and Plains, Georgia.54 Proposals for
such ordinances have been defeated or withdrawn in Charlotte,
North Carolina;55 Dallas, Texas;56 Natchitoches, Louisiana;57
Stratford, Connecticut;58 Midlothian, Illinois;59 and Pine Bluff,
Arkansas.60
Local police enforcement of these laws has varied so far.
Some municipalities have stringently enforced their
ordinances. For example, in Pine Lawn, Missouri, the police
have issued at least seventeen citations since their saggy pants
ordinance went into effect.61 In Riviera Beach, Florida, one teen
spent a night in jail after being spotted riding a bicycle with
exposed boxers,62 while at least four other violators have been
arrested under the law.63 Other cities have taken a more
conservative approach, issuing only verbal warnings to
violators. Law enforcement officials in Donaldsonville,
Louisiana, told the city council that enforcement of the new
ordinance would begin with “verbal and written warnings.”64
Similarly, the police in Hawkinsville, Georgia, have merely
47

Tanika White, Pants Proposition: The City Council Is Urged to Take a Stand
Against Trousers That Expose Underwear, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 19, 2007, at A1.
48
Wellington, supra note 3.
49
Hollinshed, Baggy Pants, supra note 42.
50
Parker, supra note 2.
51
Id.
52
Gardena Council Considers Ban on Saggy Pants, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
24, 2008.
53
David Pendered, Atlanta Bill Would Outlaw Public Show of Underwear,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 23, 2007, at A1.
54
Parker, supra note 2.
55
Lacour, supra note 7.
56
Mike Lee, Fort Worth Officials Look to Join Pants-Raising Effort, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Tex.), Sept. 24, 2008.
57
Parker, supra note 2.
58
Thomas Kaplan, A Connecticut Town Debates the Need for a Kind of BeltTightening, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at B5.
59
William Lee, Midlothian Won’t Prohibit Baggy Pants, SOUTHTOWN STAR
(Chicago, Ill.), Oct. 9, 2008, at 10.
60
Pine Bluff Councilman Withdraws Proposed Ban on Saggy Pants,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2007.
61
Hollinshed, Baggy Pants, supra note 42.
62
Kleinberg, supra note 8.
63
Cahn, supra note 45.
64
Deputies to Begin ‘Saggy’ Warnings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 13, 2008.
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warned violators as part of a public information campaign to
create awareness of the new law.65 In Flint, Michigan, police are
attempting to introduce offenders to diversionary programs
such as the Police Activities League or community groups like
neighborhood block associations instead of making arrests.66
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has
fought back against such laws, speaking out against their
constitutionality and threatening legal action against cities
with saggy pants ordinances. An organizer with the ACLU of
Georgia said the group would “certainly challenge” any saggy
pants ordinance approved by the city of Atlanta.67 In July 2008,
the ACLU of Michigan submitted a letter to the police chief of
Flint, Michigan, calling the city’s practice of classifying sagging
as disorderly conduct “a blatant violation of the United States
Constitution” and asking him to “halt this practice
immediately.”68 In addition, the ACLU of Michigan has offered
legal assistance to anyone charged under the Flint ordinance.69
While the Flint police have yet to arrest anyone for sagging,
the Flint police chief has ignored the ACLU’s request to change
his policy.70
Such threats of legal action appear to have been taken
seriously in at least a few cities. In Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the
mayor persuaded the city council to reject a saggy pants
ordinance, citing the potential expense of defending lawsuits
challenging the law.71 The Arkansas chapter of the ACLU had
expressed opposition to the proposed ordinance.72 After the
ACLU of Eastern Missouri achieved the dismissal of a Pine
Lawn, Missouri resident’s ticket for violating the saggy pants
ordinance, city officials met with ACLU representatives and
are now considering scrapping their ordinance.73 Pine Lawn’s
police chief said the ACLU “want[s] to have an extensive law
65

Burk, supra note 43.
Mickle, supra note 46.
67
Eric Stirgus, Critics Say Ban on Saggy Pants a Racial Trigger, ATLANTA J.CONST., Jan. 17, 2008, at B5.
68
Ben Schmitt & Michele Munz, Saggy-Pants Suit? Chief Will Press on
Pants, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 21, 2008, at A3.
69
Ben Schmitt, ACLU Prepares to Take Cops to Court over Saggy Pants,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 21, 2008, available at 2008 WL 13617585.
70
Mickle, supra note 46.
71
Parker, supra note 2.
72
Pine Bluff Councilman Withdraws Proposed Ban on Saggy Pants,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2007.
73
Denise Hollinshed, Pine Lawn May Scrap Prohibition on Wearing Droopy
Pants, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2008 [hereinafter Hollinshed, Pine Lawn].
66
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battle, and the mayor called a meeting saying we are not going
to spend that kind of money fighting it unless we get a pool of
money from some other people to help us fight it.”74 Such a fight
would implicate two constitutional rights, and is the subject of
Parts II and III.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FASHION

Because the wearing of saggy pants may be considered a
form of speech, saggy pants laws implicate the First
Amendment’s protection of an individual’s right to free speech.75
Part II discusses the case law pertinent to the application of
free speech rights in the context of laws banning saggy pants,
and concludes that these laws impermissibly infringe upon the
citizenry’s right to free expression.
A.

Freedom of Speech and Expressive Conduct

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”76 Although
sagging is undoubtedly conduct, the Supreme Court has long
established that the First Amendment protects symbolic speech
and expressive conduct, as well as written and spoken speech.77
Thus, the threshold inquiry in any expressive conduct claim is
whether the conduct at issue is speech entitled to protection by
the First Amendment.78

74

Id.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76
Id.
77
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) (recognizing a parade as “a form of expression”); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that the burning of an American flag
outside the Republican National Convention was expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (holding that an
American flag displayed outside a window with a peace symbol affixed to it was
protected expression); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
505-06 (1969) (recognizing that the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam
War was protected speech); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931)
(holding a state prohibition on displaying a red flag as a “sign, symbol or emblem of
opposition to organized government” unconstitutional).
78
Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (“To be sure, appellant did not choose to articulate
his views through printed or spoken words. It is therefore necessary to determine
whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall
within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .”).
75
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In Spence v. Washington, a college student was arrested
for hanging an American flag upside down outside his window
with a large peace sign made out of black removable tape
affixed to both sides.79 Spence was charged with violating
Washington’s law against improper flag use, which
criminalized affixing words or symbols to the American flag.80
The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that
Spence’s act was protected symbolic speech.81 In so doing, the
Court delineated a two-part test for determining whether
speech or conduct is expressive: whether “[a]n intent to convey
a particularized message was present, and [whether] in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”82
Simply overcoming the Spence test and establishing
that the conduct at issue is protected speech does not mean
that the conduct is immune from government regulation. First
Amendment rights are not absolute, and the government may
regulate speech provided it has a sufficient subordinating
justification.83 For example, the Supreme Court has long upheld
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in
public forums such as streets and parks.84 However, such
restrictions cannot be based on the content of the speech.
“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”85
79

Id. at 406.
Id. at 406-07.
81
Id. at 406.
82
Id. at 410-11. The Spence Court did not expressly pronounce this language
as a two-part test, but the Supreme Court has since cited Spence for this proposition.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment
into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.’”).
83
See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)
(“[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, are ‘absolutes’” (citation omitted)); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic.”).
84
See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.”).
85
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971); see also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
80
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This distinction between content-based86 and contentneutral87 restrictions on speech is a crucial one in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Content-based regulations are
“presumptively invalid”88 because “[g]overnment action that
stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government,
contravenes this essential right [of free speech].”89 Contentbased regulations are met with strict scrutiny by the courts,
meaning that they will be upheld only if the government can
show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.90
In contrast, content-neutral laws of general applicability to
speakers regardless of the viewpoint expressed or the subject
matter of the speech are given intermediate scrutiny when
challenged.91
Where protected expressive conduct is prohibited by a
content-neutral law regulating conduct, courts use the
intermediate scrutiny test announced by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O’Brien.92 In O’Brien, four individuals burned
their draft cards on the steps of a courthouse to protest the
Vietnam War.93 David Paul O’Brien was convicted of violating a
federal law that made it a crime to “knowingly destroy” or
“knowingly mutilate” draft registration certificates.94 The Court
said that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are
86

For examples of content-based laws, see Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2001) (code of judicial conduct barred judges and candidates
for judicial office from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (District of Columbia ordinance
prohibited the display of signs outside foreign embassies which would tend to bring
that foreign government into “public odium” or “public disrepute”); and Mosley, 408
U.S. at 92-93 (disorderly conduct ordinance barred picketing outside schools but
exempted “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute”).
87
For examples of content-neutral laws, see Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 290 (National Park Service regulation permitted camping in
national parks only if there was a campground designated for that purpose); City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 791-92 (1984) (municipal
code prohibited the posting of signs on public property); and Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1981) (state fair rules
prohibited the sale or distribution of merchandise or literature except from booths
rented “in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis”).
88
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
89
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
90
See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321-22; Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
91
Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642.
92
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
93
Id. at 369-70.
94
Id.
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combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.”95 The Court then articulated the test for evaluating
cases where expressive conduct is outlawed by a government
regulation:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if [1] it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.96

Using this standard, the Court upheld O’Brien’s conviction,
finding that the government’s interest in preserving draft cards
had justifications unrelated to suppression of speech, such as
expediting military mobilization in a national emergency.97
The third prong of the O’Brien test performs what has
been called a “critical switching function” at the outset of any
review of a purportedly content-neutral law regulating
expressive conduct.98 A law will be deemed content-neutral and
thus subject to O’Brien’s more lenient intermediate scrutiny
only if the asserted government interest behind the law is
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”99 Where the
state interest is related to the suppression of free expression,
the court will apply strict scrutiny, and not the O’Brien test. As
a result, such laws will only be upheld if they are necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.100

95

Id. at 376.
Id. at 377. The Court later clarified that while a content-neutral law “must
be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral
interests[,] . . . it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
97
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-80.
98
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 952
(16th ed. 2007).
99
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 567-72 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (applying O’Brien test and upholding content-neutral public
indecency statute as applied to nude dancing).
100
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (stating that “we have
limited the applicability of O’Brien’s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which
‘the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression’”).
96
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Applying the First Amendment to Saggy Pants
Ordinances

In light of the foregoing, whether a saggy pants
ordinance violates protected free speech rights under the First
Amendment will depend upon: 1) whether the practice of
sagging is deemed to be expressive conduct;101 2) whether the
asserted government interest in outlawing saggy pants is
related to the suppression of free expression;102 and 3) the
importance of the governmental interests set forth as
justification for the ordinance.103 If sagging is not expressive
conduct, the First Amendment is wholly inapplicable and offers
no protection to the violator. If the wearing of saggy pants is
deemed expressive conduct, the court must determine whether
the ordinance is content-based, thus requiring the government
to satisfy strict scrutiny, or content-neutral, thereby requiring
the ordinance to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the
O’Brien test. Because the wearing of clothes communicates
aspects of the wearer’s identity and the government interest in
regulating the citizenry’s fashion choices is negligible, saggy
pants ordinances unconstitutionally infringe upon First
Amendment rights.
1. The Problems of Particularity
In Bivens v. Albuquerque Public Schools, a federal court
in the District of New Mexico considered a free speech
challenge to a school dress code that prohibited sagging.104 A
student was suspended for repeatedly violating the dress code,
which was adopted in response to a gang problem at the high
school.105 The Bivens court determined that the student
intended to convey a particularized message, thus satisfying
the first prong of the Spence test106 to establish non-verbal
conduct as protected symbolic speech.107 The message was that
“sagging pants are a way for him to identify and express his
link with his black identity, the black culture and the styles of
101

See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
103
See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
104
Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 (D.N.M. 1995).
105
Id. at 558.
106
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974).
107
Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 560-61 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404
(1989)). Johnson, in turn, cites Spence. See supra note 82.
102
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urban black youth.”108 However, the court rejected the First
Amendment claim because of a failure to establish that “there
is a great likelihood that those who observe this expressive
conduct will understand the message.”109 The student had made
only conclusory assertions that others would understand the
message, while the school had submitted evidence in the form
of affidavits that any message conveyed by wearing saggy
pants was not apparent to viewers.110 The court noted that
sagging was understood by some as demonstrating gang
affiliation, by others as showing a desire to become gang
members, and by still others as a fashion trend followed by
many adolescents.111 Because the student had failed to
introduce exhibits or affidavits to carry his burden of
demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial, the school’s
motion for summary judgment was granted.112
Bivens, while illustrative of the perils of summary
judgment for a plaintiff with no evidence in support of factual
allegations, does not provide a conclusive answer to the
question of whether sagging is expressive conduct.113 Moreover,
the Bivens court had no incentive to find a triable issue of fact
on the question, as it indicated it would likely find for the
school even if sagging was speech.114 The court noted:
Even if the wearing of sagging pants could be construed as protected
speech, I would have grave doubts about the merits of Plaintiff’s
claim. . . . Defendants have made a strong showing . . . that the dress
code adopted at [the school] was a reasonable response to the
perceived problem of gangs within the school. . . . [T]he dress code
may have been responsible for the perception of an improved climate
and learning environment at the school.115

Thus, the outcome in Bivens can be explained by the
fact that the dispute arose in the public schools, a context
where great deference is given to the government’s interest in
maintaining the orderly administration of an inculcative
108

Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the moving party is entitled
to summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C). See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986).
113
See infra notes 125-168 and accompanying text.
114
Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 561 n.9.
115
Id.
109
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education.116 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held
that while students do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”117 the
“special characteristics of the school environment” allow for
restrictions on student expression that would be
unconstitutional if the government were to make similar
restrictions on society at large.118 Accordingly, a school may
prohibit speech that is “inconsistent with its basic educational
mission” if the speech would “substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students.”119 For example, the Supreme Court has upheld
disciplining a student for giving a lewd speech at a school
assembly120 or displaying a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” at a school-sponsored trip to watch the Olympic torch
pass through Juneau, Alaska.121 However, the Court has
guarded against suppression of unpopular or controversial
student speech out of the mere fear of a disturbance, such as
the wearing of black armbands by students to express
opposition to the Vietnam War.122 Because the Bivens court
dealt with a school dress code targeting the school’s gang
problem,123 and gang violence interferes with the work of a
school, the school’s eventual victory was inevitable.
Furthermore, Spence’s dual requirements of a
are
“particularized
message”
and
understandability124
themselves fluid concepts in the case law.125 The Supreme Court
has on several occasions found expressive conduct to be
protected speech without conducting any searching inquiry into
the particular message intended by conduct, or requiring the
message to be clearly understandable. For example, in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., a case upholding a local ordinance
proscribing public nudity from First Amendment challenge, the
court held that nude dancing behind a glass panel in a coinoperated booth in an adult bookstore “is expressive conduct
116

Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-86 (1986).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
118
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
119
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
120
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685.
121
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401-03 (2007).
122
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-10.
123
Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D.N.M. 1995).
124
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
125
See infra notes 126-148 and accompanying text.
117
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within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”126 The
only “message” the Court referred to was “the erotic message
conveyed by the dancers,” and noted that “the requirement that
the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not deprive the
dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes
the message slightly less graphic.”127 Such a vague “erotic
message” would hardly seem to be “particularized.”
More recently, the Court cast doubt upon the
requirements of particularity and understandability in Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, a
case upholding the right of private parade organizers to
exclude a group expressing a message contrary to the parade
organizers’ choosing.128 A unanimous Supreme Court explicitly
disclaimed any requirement that expression be susceptible to a
particularized understanding for it to be protected speech: “[A]
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ [citing Spence129] would
never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.”130 This language is unarguably in tension with
Spence and calls into question the Spence test’s131 continuing
validity. The Court went on to note that “a private speaker
does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate
an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech.”132 In addition to these examples, the Supreme Court
has on many occasions proclaimed art as protected speech,
even though, as Hurley recognizes, art is not always susceptible
to a “particularized message” analysis.133
The problems of the “particularized message” approach
to determining First Amendment protections in the context of
clothing regulations are illustrated by Chalifoux v. New Caney

126

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570-71 (plurality opinion).
128
515 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1995).
129
418 U.S. at 410-11.
130
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
131
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
132
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.
133
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973) (“[I]n the area of
freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to any
infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression.”).
127
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Independent School District.134 In Chalifoux, school officials
enforcing the school’s ban on “gang-related” apparel prevented
two students from wearing rosaries as necklaces.135 The
students brought a free speech suit, claiming that they wore
the rosary “with the intent to communicate their Catholic faith
to others.”136 The school district’s defense was similar to that of
the Albuquerque schools in Bivens:137 even if the students
sincerely intended to communicate a message, their conduct
failed the Spence test138 because many non-Catholics are
unfamiliar with the rosary and even those familiar with a
rosary would not understand the message because the rosary is
commonly used as an aid to prayer, rather than as a necklace.139
The district court rejected that argument in finding for the
students:
Defendants read Plaintiffs’ religious message too narrowly. Even
assuming that some persons are not familiar with the rosary,
undoubtedly they are familiar with the crucifix attached to the
center of the rosary, which is recognized universally as a symbol of
Christianity. Accordingly, there is a great likelihood that those
persons unable to associate Plaintiffs’ rosaries with Catholicism
nevertheless, will understand that Plaintiffs are Christians.
Moreover, the evidence at trial showed that wearing a rosary as a
necklace is not so abnormal that persons familiar with the rosary
would be unlikely to understand Plaintiffs’ religious message.
Therefore, the Court finds that the symbolic speech at issue in this
case is a form of religious expression protected under the First
Amendment.140

Thus, the Chalifoux court hews toward Hurley in
refusing to adopt a strict requirement of understandability,141
thereby implicitly rejecting the Spence142 test. The Chalifoux
court conceptualized the “particular message” as “I am a
Christian,” not “I am a proud Catholic,” and said the message
was understandable even though the rosary was being worn as
134

976 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D. Tex. 1997). For an in-depth treatment of
Chalifoux and the problems of school dress codes targeted at gang apparel, see
Christopher M. LaVigne, Comment, Bloods, Crips, and Christians: Fighting Gangs or
Fighting the First Amendment?, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 389 (1999).
135
Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 663.
136
Id. at 659, 665.
137
Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (D.N.M. 1995).
138
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
139
Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 665.
140
Id at 665.
141
Id.
142
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
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a necklace, a somewhat unconventional way of using a prayer
aid.143 By adopting a broad reading of the “particular message”
in the speech at issue, the court imported an expansive,
inclusive generality into a test144 looking for a “particular
message.”
This broad conception of understandability is an
entirely correct result, since by its very nature symbolic
conduct frequently does not lend itself to a “particularized
message.”145 For example, the burning of an American flag
outside the 1984 Republican National Convention was held by
the Supreme Court to be protected expressive conduct,146 but
there was not necessarily a great likelihood that a “particular”
message would be understood by those who viewed it, as the
Spence test147 requires. A bystander might easily have viewed
the message as “Down with Reagan,” “Down with Republicans,”
or even “Down with America.” In Spence itself, where
displaying an upside-down American flag with a peace sign
affixed to it was protected expressive conduct,148 the casual
viewer might discern a meaning differing from the intended
message. Spence “wanted people to know that [he] thought
America stood for peace,” and meant to protest the recent
invasion of Cambodia and the student deaths at Kent State
University.149 However, the distinction between such varying
messages as “For Peace in Vietnam” and “America Should
Generally Pursue a Pacifist Foreign Policy” isn’t readily
apparent from the mere viewing of Spence’s flag. These
examples underscore that a strict requirement of a readily
understandable “particularized message” would fail to protect
even inarguably expressive conduct.
Expressive conduct is not truly protected by the First
Amendment if it is only protected to the extent that it conveys a
particularized message easily understood by the population at
large. The symbolic conduct cases stand for the recognition that
143

Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 665.
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
145
Cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009)
(rejecting the idea that a city’s display of the Ten Commandments necessarily imparts
a religious message: “Even when a monument features the written word, the
monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by
different observers, in a variety of ways. . . . [I]t frequently is not possible to identify a
single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure . . . .”).
146
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
147
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
148
Id. at 410.
149
Id. at 408.
144
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some conduct is protected free speech, despite the fact that
conduct, by its very nature, cannot have the particularity and
understandability made possible by the written and spoken word.
2. Is Sagging Expressive Conduct?
If expressive conduct proclaiming “I am a Christian”150
and “For Peace in Vietnam”151 is to be given protected status
under the First Amendment, there is no principled way to
distinguish clothing imparting a similar message. In other
words, the particular type of conduct at issue should not
matter, as long as the conduct communicates a message. If
Spence’s peace-sign-on-American-flag symbol were instead
printed on a t-shirt, the result should be the same. So the
question is whether the conduct of wearing clothing such as
saggy pants is expressive.
Despite the potential hazards of a strictly applied
Spence test,152 potential litigants can make a straightforward
case that wearing saggy pants is expressive conduct. Among
the most common forms of communication utilized by humanity
on a daily basis is the medium of clothing and personal
appearance. As Gowri Ramachandran has noted in an
influential article, our personal appearance imparts a message
to the great majority of silent passersby: it is a means by which
we define and communicate aspects of our identity.153 Personal
appearance is a kind of performance,154 and fashion is a kind of
language.155 Through our clothes, we communicate such things
as our race, gender, sexual orientation, class, occupation, and
membership in other identity categories and subcultures.156
Thus, the UPS deliveryman’s uniform imparts a message
concerning his place of employment and reason for ringing the
150

See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (discussing Chalifoux v.
New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997)).
151
See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408 (1974)).
152
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
153
See generally Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private
Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L.
REV. 11 (2006).
154
Id. at 18-26.
155
Id. at 46.
156
Id. at 19, 41. But see City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 US 19, 25 (1989) (“It is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakesfor example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall-but
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
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doorbell. This is understood by the intended recipient, who
opens the door. The police officer’s uniform identifies her to the
public as a police officer and may deter crime. In turn, the
public may seek out the officer’s help, all without the need for a
redundant sign declaring “I am a police officer.” The
conservative suit of a lawyer or politician is intended to
communicate
professionalism,
trustworthiness,
and
seriousness of purpose. Peyton Manning’s receivers need no
sign advertising their employment with the Indianapolis Colts
football franchise. The homeless person’s poverty is usually
heartbreakingly obvious without a spoken word. The upperclass fashionista may easily convey her class and interest in
high fashion through Manolo Blahnik shoes and an Hermès
handbag.
Appearances matter. To deny that fashion is speech and
argue that clothes are purchased and worn based on mere
comfort and price considerations is to ignore human
experience. The fashion, advertising, and other industries
ranging from hairdressing to image consulting are predicated
upon the notion that personal appearance imparts a message.
It is self-evident that stiletto heels and neckties are not the
most comfortable clothing options; if speech were not part of
personal appearance, we would wear sweat suits or jeans to all
occasions. If all fashion is speech, it follows a priori that the
wearing of saggy pants is also speech.
Furthermore, sagging indeed expresses a particularized
message. As previously noted,157 the style was originally
adopted by inner city African-Americans to express
identification with urban gang and prison culture.158 The style
subsequently was adopted by hip-hop music artists.159 The
broad popularity of hip-hop has spread the style to the genre’s
adherents.160 Thus, the wearing of sagging pants communicates
identification with the hip-hop music subculture or an
157

See supra notes 17-18.
Trebay, In Jailhouse, supra note 18 (discussing the influence of prison
uniforms on street style).
159
Neil Strauss, For Every Beat There Is a Fashion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995,
at 39.
160
Trebay, Taking Hip-Hop, supra note 21 (noting that “[t]he history of style
th
in the late 20 century … is substantially the history of hip-hop,” and any survey of
fashion in the last two decades could not omit the importance of “track suits, sweat
clothes, wrestling, boxing or soccer shoes, designer sneakers, outsize denims, prisonstyle jumpsuits, underwear worn above the trouser waistband, do-rags, cargo pants,
messenger bags, dreadlocks, cornrows, athletic jerseys, Kangol caps”) (emphasis
added).
158
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affiliation with urban gang culture, or both. As the Bivens court
put it, saggy pants express a “link with [one’s] black identity,
the black culture and the styles of black urban youth.”161 As
discussed in Part II.B.1., supra, the Spence test has proved to
be an elastic concept and is in tension with other Supreme
Court cases protecting speech with no readily understandable
“particularized message,” if not the facts of Spence itself. As the
Supreme Court said in Hurley, “a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection”.162 If “I
am for peace in Vietnam”163 or “I am a Christian”164 is particular
enough for First Amendment protection, “I am a hip-hop fan”
or “I am an African-American youth” should also suffice.
Moreover, any government defense that saggy pants are
not expressive conduct is at odds with the government
approach to preventing gang violence. Many school districts
ban “gang-related” apparel, which may include saggy pants,
under dress codes designed to reduce gang violence.165 At least
one city has enacted a local ordinance prohibiting the wearing
of “known gang colors, emblems, or other insignia.”166 One
county in New Mexico authorized the police to exclude
members of the public wearing backwards hats under a “zero
tolerance” approach to gang activity at the county fair.167 In the
law of criminal procedure, saggy pants are part of the totality
of the circumstances which may arouse a reasonable suspicion
that a member of the public may pose a safety threat, thus
161

Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (D.N.M. 1995).
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
163
See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408 (1974)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (recognizing that the wearing of black armbands
to protest the Vietnam War was protected speech).
164
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (discussing Chalifoux v.
New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997)).
165
See, e.g., Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1305
(8th Cir. 1997) (challenged dress code stated that “[g]ang related activities such as
display of ‘colors’, symbols, signals, signs, etc., will not be tolerated on school grounds”);
Chalifoux, 976 F. Supp. at 664 (challenged school dress code prohibited “gang-related
apparel” such as “[o]versized apparel, including baggy pants which are worn low on the
waist”); Bivens, 899 F. Supp. at 558 (challenged dress code prohibited the wearing of
sagging pants); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (challenged school dress code provided that “[c]lothes shall be sufficient to
conceal undergarments at all times”).
166
City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
167
Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1236-37 (D.N.M. 2000). For a
discussion of the First Amendment claim in this case, see infra note 188 and
accompanying text.
162
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justifying a patdown search.168 As these examples illustrate, the
government clearly finds that the dress of gang members has a
communicative element, or there would be no inference of gang
membership from the wearing of clothes. Christopher M.
LaVigne makes the same point in his analysis of the Chalifoux
decision:
School boards have justified prohibitions on gang-related apparel
because of the threat of violence between rival gangs. For this threat
of violence truly to exist, the [gang] symbols must be understood by
those who view them. If individuals cannot comprehend the message
of these symbols, or if one gang member cannot ascertain the
affiliation of another gang member based upon what they are
wearing, why bother regulating the symbols? It stretches credibility
for the state to argue that this form of symbolic speech needs to be
suppressed because of the danger the message presents, and then to
turn around and argue that these symbols are not even speech
because there is no identifiable message.169

3. The Government Interest in Prohibiting Saggy Pants
A detailed evaluation of the governmental interest
justifying a saggy pants ordinance is difficult in the context of
this Note’s generalized treatment of the issue across
jurisdictions. However, a few interests emerge as likely
justifications based on local officials’ statements. It bears
repeating that this Note’s scope is confined to the
constitutionality of saggy pants laws as they apply to a person
who is not revealing any flesh whatsoever, but merely has
visible undergarments above the waistband of the wearer’s
pants or shorts.
The most common justification for outlawing saggy
pants is combating indecency and immorality, i.e., that society
should be shielded from the sight of exposed underwear.170
168

State of Oregon v. Miglavs, 90 P.3d 607, 612-13 (Or. 2004) (“[A] particular
style of attire may be a circumstance that, when considered in the overall context or
totality of the circumstances of a police-citizen contact, contributes to the
reasonableness of an officer’s safety assessment.”). For a broader treatment of the
problems of racial profiling by police, see Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of
African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection,
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439 (2004) and Suzin Kim, Note, Gangs and Law Enforcement:
The Necessity of Limiting the Use of Gang Profiles, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 265 (1996).
169
Christopher M. LaVigne, Comment, Bloods, Crips, and Christians:
Fighting Gangs or Fighting the First Amendment, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 409-10
(1999) (emphasis added).
170
See, e.g., Parker, supra note 2 (quoting the sponsor of a proposed ordinance
in Opa-locka, Fla., referring to sagging as “not decent”); Lacour, supra note 7 (reporting
that the sponsor of the defeated ordinance in Charlotte, NC, said its purpose was to
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Other asserted interests include economic development,171
improving the job prospects and character of local youth,172 and
discouraging criminality.173
At first blush, saggy pants laws might seem to be
content-neutral regulations of conduct, thus making the
O’Brien test’s intermediate scrutiny apply.174 In Barnes v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., a plurality opinion of the Supreme
Court said that indecent exposure laws are content-neutral, as
they are justified by society’s interest in order and morality,
rather than the suppression of free expression.175 However, a
majority of the Court has never held that morality alone was
an interest that justified the suppression of speech.176 Along
these lines, the Court has deemed a facially content-based
zoning law that regulated only the location of adult movie
theaters to be content-neutral because it was justified by the
content-neutral desire to control the “secondary effects” of such
theaters, such as crime and reductions in property values and
quality of life.177 Thus, cities with saggy pants ordinances might
make sure “clothing didn’t [violate] standards of decency”); Mickle, supra note 46, at 1
(quoting the Flint, Mich., police chief as referring to saggy pants as “immoral selfexpression”).
171
Editorial, Saggy Pants Shouldn’t Throw Village for a Loop, CHICAGO SUNTIMES, July 22, 2008, at 21 (noting that Lynwood, Il., village officials hope that a saggy
pants ordinance “will help attract major retailers and boost economic development” by
discouraging saggers); Hollinshed, Baggy Pants, supra note 42 (“Officials said one
reason for the ordinance was that saggy pants gave potential developers a bad
impression of the city.”).
172
Hollinshed, supra note 42 (noting that the police force of Pine Lawn,
Missouri, is explaining to the public that “saggy pants could hurt someone’s chances of
getting a job”); Bellantoni, supra note 35 (noting that the sponsor of the defeated saggy
pants bill in Virginia said he wanted to improve the character of young persons
wearing saggy pants); Parker, supra note 2 (characterizing the saggy pants laws
movement as “fueled by growing worries among lawmakers that sloppy dress by
America’s youth could be related, no matter how indirectly, to delinquency, poor
learning, and crime.”).
173
See, e.g., William Lee, Village Cracks Down on Exposed Undies, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at 18 (stating that the proposal for a saggy pants ordinance
in Midlothian, Il., was “fueled by residents’ concerns that sagging pants is indicative of
a gang problem in the village”); Ben Schmitt, ACLU Prepares to Take Cops to Court
over Saggy Pants, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 21, 2008 (reporting that the police chief
in Flint, Mich., said enforcing the city’s disorderly conduct ordinance against saggers
can give police probable cause to search for evidence of other crimes such as weapon or
drug possession).
174
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
175
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1991) (plurality opinion).
176
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970
(16th ed. 2007).
177
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986); see also City
of Erie v. PAP’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000) (plurality opinion) (using “secondary
effects” analysis).
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claim that prohibiting sagging is justified by combating the
evils of indecency, as well as alleged secondary effects like
criminality and reduced retail trade. However, a closer analysis
reveals that such laws are content-based because they subject
only one type of message to penalty: visible underwear is
illegal, but visible swim trunks or shorts covering the same
area are legal.
Under the O’Brien test’s intermediate scrutiny, in order
for the restriction on speech to be upheld, the asserted
governmental interest must be substantial or important and
the means chosen to promote that interest must be “narrowly
tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral
interests.”178 While the governmental interest in preventing
public nudity is undoubtedly substantial,179 the same argument
does not carry over to the mere sight of underwear. Underwear
which obscures all flesh is no different than shorts or swim
trunks, which cover the same area. In reality, the government
interest in prohibiting saggy pants is in combating the “idea” of
underwear, not the sight of flesh. The “important” government
interest behind saggy pants laws is in dictating the fashion
choices of the citizenry, not in prohibiting public nudity. Hence,
the government interest is related to the suppression of
expression. Even if a court found such laws to be contentneutral, the under-inclusive nature of saggy pants laws, which
prohibit underwear but not shorts or swimwear, indicates that
such laws are not closely tailored to the government interest,
thus failing the O’Brien test.
With regard to the secondary effects argument, the
shortcomings of “narrow tailoring” are magnified. A city would
be hard-pressed to find evidentiary support180 for any secondary
effects of saggy pants, much less a link between visible
178

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568-72 (plurality opinion).
180
Under the secondary effects analysis of Renton and City of Erie, some
modicum of evidentiary support is needed to tie the harmful secondary effects to the
expressive conduct. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion) (“In terms of
demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not ‘conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities’ to
demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, ‘so long as whatever evidence the city
relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses.’” (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986))); see
also id. at 310-16 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
plurality for upholding the ban on nude dancing when “the record before us today is
deficient in its failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either for
the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy”).
179
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underwear and a lack of economic development. It strains
credulity to imagine a relationship between visible underwear
and criminality.181 Prohibiting sagging in public would not seem
a closely tailored mechanism to improve the citizenry’s
performance at job interviews.
As anti-sagging laws can only be truly justified by a
government interest in suppressing the indecent and offensive
message that displaying one’s underwear expresses, strict
scrutiny should apply. Strict scrutiny by the courts will mean
that the saggy pants ordinance will survive only if it is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.182 As just discussed, even under
the more relaxed intermediate scrutiny of the O’Brien test, it is
doubtful whether a city could establish an “important”
government interest justifying a ban on saggy pants, much less
show that such laws are closely tailored to the interest.
Therefore, it is hard to see how a saggy pants ordinance would
pass the “most exacting scrutiny”183 given to content-based
regulations of speech.
Under strict scrutiny, saggy pants ordinances should be
easily invalidated, as the Supreme Court has made abundantly
clear that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”184 The First Amendment places
the burden on the offended public, rather than the offensive
speaker.185 More concretely, as between ignoring the offense
181

Note that mere membership in a gang or otherwise being a gangster is not
a crime, absent a violation of some other substantive law. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 457 (1939).
182
See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988); Perry Ed. Ass’n. v.
Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980).
183
Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
184
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also, e.g., Police Dep’t of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(“[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”).
185
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (reversing the conviction of
a man arrested for wearing a jacket in a courthouse bearing the words “Fuck the
Draft”: “[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve
automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense. While this Court
has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit
intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be
totally banned from the public dialogue, we have at the same time consistently stressed
that we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
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received by some viewers of saggy pants and affirmatively
prohibiting sagging, the Framers of the Constitution have
foreclosed the public’s choice in the matter.186 Accordingly,
saggy pants ordinances should be found to violate the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech.
The outcome of a First Amendment claim, however, is
by no means certain. The potential hazards of a strictly applied
Spence test187 could leave litigants wholly outside the
protections of the First Amendment if a court finds sagging not
to be expressive conduct.188 Indeed, several courts have held
that restrictions on clothing choices do not implicate the First
Amendment. For example, in Zalewska v. County of Sullivan,
New York, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied a claim
that a uniform policy prohibiting a government employee from
wearing a skirt to work violated the First Amendment.189 The
Zalewska court said that while wearing a skirt is “expressive,”
“it does not constitute the type of expressive conduct which
would allow her to invoke the First Amendment in challenging
the county’s regulation because the ordinary viewer would
glean no particularized message from . . . wearing a skirt
rather than pants as part of her uniform.”190 Similarly, in Hodge
v. Lynd, a federal district court in New Mexico found that the
police did not implicate the free speech rights of a county fair
patron who was excluded from the fair for wearing a
backwards-facing baseball cap with no words or symbols.191
objectionable speech. The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent
upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections” (internal
citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
186
Cf. id. (referring to the offended viewers of Cohen’s jacket: “[t]hose in the
Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”).
187
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see supra Part II.B.1.
188
There is certainly language in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to
support such a finding. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakesfor example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall-but
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”).
189
Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, New York, 316 F.3d 314, 319-21 (2d Cir.
2003). For a discussion of the due process claim brought in this case, see infra notes
228-229 and accompanying text.
190
Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 320.
191
Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1237-38 (D.N.M. 2000).

694

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:2

Even passing this initial hurdle of establishing sagging as
symbolic conduct will still require demonstrating that the
regulation fails either the O’Brien test or strict scrutiny.192
Thus, the potential difficulties of a First Amendment challenge
to saggy pants ordinances means that challengers should also
assert violations of the Due Process Clause’s protections of
individual liberty.
III.

DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE

Saggy pants laws also implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of an individual’s liberty. Because
they regulate what citizens may or may not wear, saggy pants
ordinances may violate a liberty interest in personal
appearance protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.193 Part III surveys the case law
pertinent to the application of this constitutional right in the
context of laws banning saggy pants, and concludes that
prohibiting saggy pants is not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.
A.

The Due Process Liberty Interest Legal Landscape

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part,
“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”194 Due process entails two
separate limitations on government power: procedural due
process and substantive due process.195 Procedural due process
refers to the procedures to be used before a person may be
deprived of life, liberty, or property.196 In addition, the Supreme
Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause also restricts the substance of governmental

192

See supra Part II.B.3.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
194
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
195
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring); see generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545-48 (3d ed. 2006).
196
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (holding that the
government must conduct a hearing before termination of welfare benefits); see
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 195, at 545-604.
193
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regulation, and requires the government to have an adequate
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property.197
Substantive due process refers to the notion that some
individual liberties are so important to the concept of freedom
that, although not mentioned in the text of the Constitution,
they are deemed to be “fundamental rights” which the
government cannot infringe unless strict scrutiny is met.198 For
example, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents have
a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their
children, and termination of custody rights requires a
compelling government purpose, such as preventing child
abuse.199 If a court recognizes a liberty interest, but finds that
the right is not fundamental, generally the government must
only have some rational basis for passing the law which
infringes upon the right, i.e. the law or regulation must have a
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.200
There is no bright-line rule for determining what
substantive rights are protected by the Due Process Clause,201
197

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding a state ban on
abortions unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding a ban on
interracial marriages unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(holding a state ban on the teaching of foreign languages to children unconstitutional).
Aside from the analysis of substantive due process rights in the context of individual
civil rights contained herein, there is an earlier line of cases concerning substantive
due process in the context of economic liberties. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a law which limited the number of hours
bakers could work as violating liberty of contract). This “economic liberties” line of
cases was later abandoned. See, e.g.,Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought.”); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)..
198
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746, 753 (1982) (recognizing that
“freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” and specifically finding that “[t]he
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child” was implicated by the case); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(recognizing the right to marry as a fundamental right protected under the Due
Process Clause).
199
See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 65158 (1972).
200
See, e.g., Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488 (“It is enough that there is an evil at
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (“The
established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”).
201
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due
process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by
reference to any code.”).

696

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:2

but the Supreme Court has emphasized that fundamental
rights are those which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”202 For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the
Court set forth its conception:
Without doubt, [due process] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.203

The liberty interest in controlling one’s personal
appearance has been repeatedly invoked by litigants in due
process challenges to dress codes, with varying success. In the
1960s and 1970s, numerous students and teachers challenged
hair length and beard restrictions in the public schools,204 and
courts took widely divergent positions on the issue. For
example, in Richards v. Thurston, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the suspension of a student for refusing to
cut his hair violated the student’s personal liberty as protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
was unjustified absent unclean hair.205 In Breen v. Kahl, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that “[t]he right to
wear one’s hair at any length or in any desired manner” was a
“fundamental right” protected by either the First or Ninth

202

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. To the extent the casual reader might literally
construe “freedom from bodily restraint” to protect the wearer of saggy pants from
being forced to apply a belt, this language refers to the fact that prisoners and those
involuntarily committed to mental institutions are by definition deprived of liberty and
are thus accorded procedural due process protections. See generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 195, at 566-67.
204
See, e.g., Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wheeler County, Ga., 426 F.2d 1154,
1158 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming suspension of students for refusal to shave based on
evidence that “a failure to shave is a departure from the norm which has a diverting
influence on the student body”); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir.
1970) (holding that suspension of a high school student for refusing to cut his hair
violated due process); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217-18 (6th Cir. 1970)
(affirming suspension of long-haired students from due process and First Amendment
challenges); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that
students’ right to wear long hair is fundamental and could only be abridged by showing
long hair disrupted the educational process). For an in-depth treatment of the long hair
and grooming cases, see Recent Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1702-04 & n.4 (1971).
205
Thurston, 424 F.2d at 1285-86.
203
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Amendments,206 which could not be abridged without a showing
of a “substantial justification.”207 On the other end of the
spectrum, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferrell v.
Dallas Independent School District upheld a school regulation
banning long hair from First Amendment and due process
challenges, due to the “compelling” state interest in
“maintaining an effective and efficient school system.”208 The
Supreme Court never took up the issue of whether schools may
restrict the personal appearance of students and teachers,
despite the circuit split.209
The only time the Supreme Court has decided a case in
which a litigant asserted a due process liberty interest in
personal appearance, the Court assumed without deciding that
such a right did in fact exist.210 In Kelley v. Johnson, a
policeman challenged the validity of a hair grooming regulation
for the male members of the Suffolk County, New York police
force on both free speech and due process grounds.211 The
regulation contained restrictions on the style and length of
hair, sideburns, and moustaches, and banned beards and
goatees unless medically necessary.212 The Court assumed, for
the purposes of deciding the case against the policeman, that
206

The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
207
Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036.
208
Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1968). In
Domico v. Rapides Parish School Board, 675 F.2d 100, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals later held that there was a due process liberty interest in the
freedom to choose one’s hairstyle.
209
At least twice, Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari of a
long-hair case. In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 U.S. 856, 856
(1968), he noted:
[A] nation bent on turning out robots might insist that every male have a
crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of “life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness,” expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later
found specific definition in the Constitution itself, including of course freedom
of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had supposed those guarantees
permitted idiosyncrasies to flourish, especially when they concern the image
of one’s personality and his philosophy toward government and his fellow
men.
In Olff v. East Side Union High School District, 404 U.S.
Douglas characterized the situation as one where “[t]he
and the decisions in disarray,” and found it “incredible
State can deny a student education in its public school
comports with the standards of the school board.”
210
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976).
211
Id. at 239-41.
212
Id. at 239-40.

1042, 1042-46 (1972), Justice
federal courts are in conflict
that under our federalism a
system unless his hair style
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“the citizenry at large has some sort of ‘liberty’ interest within
the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal
appearance.”213 The Court used a rational basis standard of
review, explaining that “the constitutional issue to be
decided . . . is whether [the county’s] determination that such
regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be
branded ‘arbitrary,’ and therefore a deprivation of [the
policeman’s] ‘liberty’ interest in freedom to choose his own
hairstyle.”214 The Court found that there was a rational
connection between the grooming regulations and promoting
public safety, as the regulations fostered similarity in
appearance of police officers, which made officers more easily
recognized by the public and helped inculcate an esprit de corps
in the police force.215
However, the Kelley ruling explicitly noted the
significance of Johnson’s status as a police officer and
government employee.216 The Court explained that the
regulation “cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather must be
considered in the context of the county’s chosen mode of
organization for its police force.”217 The Court distinguished
claims by “the citizenry at large” from employees of the police
department, calling the distinction “highly significant.”218 It
analogized to a case dealing with the free speech rights of
government employees, and said that “the State has interests
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”219 The
Court discounted any suggestion that a claim by a government
employee asserting a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment “must necessarily be treated . . . the same as a
similar claim by a member of the general public.”220
In addition, Justice Thurgood Marshall strongly
dissented from the majority opinion in Kelley, and was joined

213

Id. at 244.
Id. at 247-48.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 244-45.
217
Id. at 247.
218
Id. at 244-45.
219
Id. at 245 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
220
Id. at 248-49.
214
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by Justice William Brennan.221 They believed “it [is] clear that
the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed protect against
comprehensive regulation of what citizens may or may not
wear,” and found the county’s justifications lacking.222 Marshall
said to deny a liberty interest in matters of personal
appearance “would be fundamentally inconsistent with the
values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal
integrity that . . . the Constitution was designed to protect.”223
Justice
Marshall
referenced
historical
instances
of
authoritarian governments regulating the personal appearance
of their citizens, such as Peter the Great’s “beard tax” in Russia
and Libya’s threat to draft long-haired youths into the army,
saying, “It is inconceivable to me that the Constitution would
offer no protection whatsoever against the carrying out of
similar actions by either our Federal or State Governments.”224
Since Kelley, courts adjudicating challenges to
regulations of personal appearance have followed its rationale,
giving deference to the government’s interest in regulating the
appearance of government employees.225 Courts have held that
teachers may be fired for wearing skirts too short,226 or
reprimanded for refusing to wear neckties,227 because of the
schools’ rational interest in “promoting respect for authority
and traditional values, as well as discipline in the classroom,
by requiring teachers to dress in a professional manner.”228
Police officers may constitutionally be reprimanded for wearing
221

Id. at 249-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Lewis Powell
wrote a concurring opinion to stress that the majority opinion did not hold that there
was no liberty interest in personal appearance, and noted that the regulation at issue
was justifiably applied to a police force, but “would be an impermissible intrusion upon
liberty in a different context.” Id. at 249 (Powell, J., concurring).
222
Id. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223
Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
224
Id. at 253-54 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225
See infra notes 226-232 and accompanying text.
226
Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 763-64 (1st Cir. 1976). In Tardif, the First
Circuit noted:
[W]e are not dealing with personal appearance in what might be termed an
individual sense, but in a bilateral sense a contractual relationship.
Whatever constitutional aspect there may be to one’s choice of apparel
generally, it is hardly a matter which falls totally beyond the scope of the
demands which an employer, public or private, can legitimately make upon
its employees.
Id. at 763.
227

East Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838,
863 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
228
Id. at 859.
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earrings, regardless of whether the ear studs are worn on or off
duty.229 A uniform policy requiring county-employed “Meals on
Wheels” van drivers to wear pants was upheld when an
employee was suspended for insisting on wearing a skirt.230 The
court found a rational basis for the regulation in the “safety
problem” that skirts may pose to employees operating
wheelchair lifts.231
On the other hand, courts have conducted a more
searching inquiry into the purported rationales for dress
regulations affecting the general public. The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that a Chicago ordinance prohibiting a person
from wearing clothing of the opposite sex with intent to conceal
his or her sex was unconstitutional as applied to two
transsexuals adopting a female lifestyle in anticipation of
sexual reassignment operations.232 The Illinois Supreme Court
found the city’s twin justifications of discouraging crime and
protecting public morals unsupported by any evidence linking
cross-dressing with criminality or harm to society.233
In DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down a Palm Beach, Florida ordinance
that prohibited appearing in public without a covering on the
upper part of the body, after a male jogger who preferred to jog
shirtless sued on due process grounds.234 The town’s two
justifications, stabilizing property values and maintaining
Palm Beach’s history, tradition, identity, and quality of life,
were found to be not rationally related to shirtless jogging by
males.235 The DeWeese Court suggested that regulation of the
dress of citizens at large “is simply not a legitimate
governmental interest,” and that the jogger’s case was
indistinguishable from hypothetical laws requiring all citizens
to wear brown shirts or prohibiting women from appearing in
public in slacks or with bare calves—“[w]e are satisfied that
such intrusions on the liberty interests of citizens at large
229

Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1990).
Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2003).
For a discussion of the First Amendment claim brought in this case, see supra notes
187-188 and accompanying text.
231
Id.
232
City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524-25 (Il. 1978).
233
Id. For a general discussion of the history of sumptuary laws banning
cross-dressing and the role of dress and appearance in criminal law, see Bennett
Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2008).
234
DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 1987).
235
Id. at 1367-68.
230
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would not pass constitutional muster, absent identification of
some rational basis which has not yet been brought to our
attention and which is beyond our present imagination.”236
However, on at least one occasion, the liberty interest in
personal appearance by the public at large has been
subordinated to a state interest.237 In Williams v. Kleppe,
decided shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelley v.
Johnson, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a National
Park Service regulation prohibiting nude sunbathing at a
remote beach in Cape Cod Seashore National Park.238 Brush
Hollow beach, at which skinny-dipping had been tolerated for
nearly fifty years, eventually grew so popular that it attracted
up to 1200 sunbathers a day.239 According to the court, the
government’s interest in preventing environmental damage to
the beach resulting from Brush Hollow’s increased popularity
justified the regulation.240
B.

Due Process and Saggy Pants Ordinances

As a preliminary matter, the freedom to make decisions
regarding one’s personal appearance would seem to be “deeply
rooted within this Nation’s history and tradition.”241 Indeed,
during the 1789 congressional debates over the Bill of Rights, it
was assumed to exist.242 When debating whether the right of
assembly should be included in the First Amendment, some
Framers argued that it was superfluous to expressly mention a
right of assembly because it was so clear that such a right
could not be restricted by the government.243 Congressman
Egbert Benson of New York argued for expressly mentioning
the right in order to assure that it would never be infringed.244
Congressman Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts replied:
If the committee were governed by that general principle . . . they
might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat
if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed
236
237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 1369-70.
See, e.g., Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 805-07.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-07.
The quoted language is from Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,

503 (1977).
242
243
244

IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 54-55 (1965).
Id.
Id. at 54.
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when he thought proper; but [I] would ask the gentleman whether
he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of
rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be
infringed.245

As Justice Thurgood Marshall later explained:
Thus, while they did not include it in the Bill of Rights, Sedgwick
and his colleagues clearly believed there to be a right in one’s
personal appearance. And, while they may have regarded the right
as a trifle as long as it was honored, they clearly would not have so
regarded it if it were infringed.246

Given this history, the Kelley Court’s assumption that
the citizenry has a liberty interest in personal appearance,247
and the fact that several Circuit Courts of Appeal have
affirmed such a right,248 litigants challenging saggy pants
ordinances should be able to establish the right (thus clearing
the first hurdle in a substantive due process claim). However,
no court has gone so far as to declare such a right to be
“fundamental.” Accordingly, saggy pants laws will likely be
given rational basis review, which means the laws must have a
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.249
Local government has a legitimate purpose if it advances a
traditional police power such as protecting safety, public
health, or public morals.250 However, the Supreme Court has
indicated that a simple moral justification for a law may not
always satisfy the requirement of a legitimate purpose.251 The
245

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 732 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The discussion took place
in the House of Representatives on August 15, 1789.
246
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 252 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247
Id. at 244 (majority opinion).
248
See Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting
that “this circuit has held that choice of appearance is an element of liberty”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1367 (11th
Cir. 1987) (declaring that whether such a right exists “is not an open question in this
circuit”); Domico v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 675 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating
that “there is a constitutional liberty interest in choosing how to wear one’s hair”);
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1970) (invalidating a school’s
hair length regulation on due process grounds).
249
See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (explaining that “[i]f a
legislative classification or distinction ‘neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets
a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996))).
250
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (declaring that “[p]ublic safety,
public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order . . . are some of the more conspicuous
examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.”).
251
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado
Constitutional amendment that repealed all laws protecting gays and lesbians from
discrimination).
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Court has said that “a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest,” as when Congress passed a law with
the express purpose of denying food stamps to residents of
hippie communes.252 Obviously, a purpose of infringing upon a
constitutional right such as freedom of religion or the right to
vote would not be legitimate.
As noted above, while courts have generally deferred to the
government’s rationale in regulating the appearance of students
and government employees, no such deference has been given to
equivalent restrictions on the general public.253 As the Supreme
Court noted in Kelley, this distinction is “highly significant.”254
Communities defending saggy pants ordinances will
likely put forth rationales similar to those mentioned in the
earlier discussion of the First Amendment issues surrounding
saggy pants ordinances, namely combating indecency,
discouraging criminality, improving the job prospects and
character of local youth, and boosting economic development.255
To these may be added rationales asserted by other cities
regulating the general public dress, such as Palm Beach’s
justifications for banning shirtless jogging in the DeWeese case:
stabilizing property values and preserving the city’s history,
tradition, identity, and quality of life.256
None of these justifications appear to be rationally
related to prohibiting saggy pants. The Supreme Court in
Kelley explained that the issue is whether the law’s
justification “is so irrational that it may be branded
‘arbitrary.’”257 Regarding indecency, it may be irrational to ban
the sight of an item of clothing whose purpose is to cover up the
reproductive organs and buttocks. It is certainly arbitrary to
252

U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer,
517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14,
27 (1985) (invalidating a law which had no purpose other than favoring residents of
Vermont over nonresidents as not furthering a legitimate state interest); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (declaring that a bare interest in favoring long-time
Alaska residents over new residents was not a legitimate state interest).
253
See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
254
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1976); see also Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (“Once the personal liberty is shown, the
countervailing interest must either be self-evident or be affirmatively shown.”).
255
See supra Part II.B.3.
256
DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1987).
257
Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 845 (1998) (“We have emphasized time and again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government’ . . . .”).
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ban underwear, but not shorts or swimwear, which cover the
very same area.258 Similarly, there seems to be no relationship
between wearing saggy pants and crime, other than the fact
that some gangsters wear saggy pants. However, absent
participation in an unlawful activity, being a gang member in
and of itself is not a crime.259
The other justifications for sagging ordinances also lack
a rational relationship to outlawing saggy pants, apart from
mere conclusory assertions that they do. Prohibiting saggy
pants does not appear rationally related to improving the
character and morality of local youth, much less improving
their job prospects.260 It is hard to conceive of evidentiary
support for a relationship between property values or a lack of
economic development and saggy pants.261 Likewise, a local
history or tradition of requiring citizens to maintain their
pants at waist level would be hard to substantiate.262
At bottom, it would appear the only justification for
saggy pants ordinances is the city’s interest in regulating the
personal appearance of its citizens to conform to the city’s
taste. This, as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggested
in DeWeese, “is simply not a legitimate governmental
interest.”263 As the Supreme Court stated over a hundred years
ago, “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”264 More recently, in his Kelley
258

Cf. supra Part II.B.3.
See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457 (1939) (striking down a New
Jersey statute making it a crime to be a gangster); see also Suzin Kim, Note, Gangs
and Law Enforcement: The Necessity of Limiting the Use of Gang Profiles, 5 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 265, 281-82 (1996); N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 91820 (1982) (“The First Amendment . . . restricts the ability of the State to impose
liability on an individual solely because of his association with another.”).
260
Cf. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (declaring
that the court “see[s] no inherent reason why decency, decorum, or good conduct
requires a boy to wear his hair short. Certainly eccentric hair styling is no longer a
reliable signal of perverse behavior.”).
261
Cf. DeWeese, 812 F.2d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that property
values were not rationally related to presence of shirtless joggers).
262
Cf. id. at 1367-68 (noting the lack of evidentiary support for a city’s
“history or tradition requiring men to wear a shirt when toplessness is appropriate”).
263
Cf. id. at 1369.
264
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) (“The right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’
of which the citizen cannot be deprived . . . [i]t may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.”).
259
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dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that “[i]f little can
be found in past cases of this Court or indeed in the Nation’s
history on the specific issue of a citizen’s right to choose his
own personal appearance, it is only because the right has been
so clear as to be beyond question.”265
Thus, saggy pants laws violate due process, as they
strike at the very heart of each citizen’s liberty.266 A constitution
which protects freedoms exercised only infrequently, such as
voting or speaking out in dissent, surely should protect a
citizen’s choice in daily attire. There is no self-evident
justification for such laws aside from furthering a government
interest in regulating the fashion choices of the public, which is
not a legitimate, much less rational, use of the government’s
power. It is an illegitimate use of the state’s police power if the
only purpose for a law is to deny a right so “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition” that the Framers of the
Constitution thought it self-evident that government could not
infringe.267 If saggy pants laws do not violate due process, there
would seem to be no principled distinction between antisagging laws and hypothetical laws further down the slippery
slope toward compelled national conformity in dress and
hairstyle.268
IV.

CONCLUSION

Saggy pants laws impinge upon two important
constitutional rights, the First Amendment’s protection of free
speech and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of individual
liberties.269 Sagging, like all fashion choices, is expressive conduct
intended to communicate aspects of our identity to passersby.270
An individual’s right to free speech should not be limited to easily
understandable or conventional speech, as human expression is

265

Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) )).
267
The quoted language is from Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977).
268
See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 253 & n.4 (“[I]t would be distressing, to say the
least, if the government could regulate our personal appearance unconfined by any
constitutional strictures whatsoever.”); see also supra note 234 and accompanying text.
269
See supra Parts II and III, respectively.
270
See supra Part II.B.2.
266
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not similarly limited.271 The nature of the governmental interests
asserted in defense of saggy pants laws are not substantial or
narrowly-tailored enough to justify the intrusion upon the public’s
self-autonomy and rights of expression.272 However, the potential
shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s principal First Amendment
test for defining expressive conduct suggest that the more
promising avenue for potential litigants is under the Due Process
Clause’s protections of individual liberty.
Saggy pants ordinances impermissibly encroach upon the
citizen’s right to liberty in matters of personal appearance.273
Whatever may be the rationale for government restrictions on the
dress of students and government employees, similar restrictions
on the general public are an entirely different matter.274 There is
no rational justification for saggy pants laws aside from a raw
assertion that government has an interest in dictating the fashion
choices of the citizenry.275 Such a bold intrusion on the very heart
of personal freedom should not be countenanced in a system of
government based on individual liberty.
William C. Vandivort†
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